Such notions and categorizations matter: religious group members are extremely diverse, whereby religion or even religious extremism is expressed in very different ways.
Problematic too is that such simplistic representations are consequential in that they determine the perception of extremist groups. It appears then that the term religious extremism engenders negative stereotypes toward particular groups of religious people among the public and policy-makers. To counter such simplistic understandings of religious extremism, we present a multidimensional model of religious extremism that aims to advance our knowledge of religion as a complex and diverse social identity Ysseldyk et al.
In particular, we challenge the idea that religious extremism manifests only in one particular way and suggest that one dimension of religious extremism e.
In this paper, we briefly review the different interpretations and understandings of extremism within religion and propose an alternative model that allows for a more accurate and complete understanding of various dimensions of religion. We argue that our analysis will help to explain why, despite the perceived similarities that lead outsiders to cluster them together, extreme movements are often in conflict with one another over what it means to be a good religious person.
To illustrate the multidimensional nature of religious extremism, we focus on one particular context: Indonesian Muslims. We propose that in other faith contexts, the dimensions proposed may need to be expanded or adjusted to be more accurate and useful.
In psychological research, a variety of terms have been used to describe an engagement with religion, such as religiosity e. These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes contested e. Moreover, while religiosity has been linked to positive outcomes such as higher well-being e. One prominent definition of extremism as a motivation for terrorism is that extremism comprises ideological beliefs about an obligation to bring back the political system to a form suggested by religious norms through violence Arena and Arrigo, Therefore, the label of extremist is attributed to groups fighting for their political agendas against mainstream systems accepted by the majority of people e.
Such a definition of extremism associated with political violence is related to broad collective responses against perceived oppression or injustice, and it may be fueled by extreme religious dogma or not.
The understanding of religious extremism as political has been elaborated by many scholars. For example, religious extremists have been characterized by Sageman as seeking martyrdom, and fueled by anger regarding perceived injustice. Similarly, Wiktorowicz proposed a four-stage model of extremism culminating in violence: first, a cognitive openness to new people or new ideas followed by the experiences of personal or group grievance e.
A similar model of religious extremism as the culmination of a trajectory of religious identity into group-based violence is put forward by Silber and Bhatt The process of being extreme begins with an openness to new thoughts e. Within this process, a tragic experience can lead to the loss of meaning and connection with the initial identity e. The adoption of extreme beliefs and norms fuelled by tragedy is enhanced by the indoctrination process operated by an extreme organization.
Again, religious extremism is seen to reach its ultimate end in the expression of violence by the actor. The above conceptual approaches to extremism associate extremism with violence committed as a group member. Other more individual-level analyses of extremism operationalize it as endorsement of particular beliefs, such as the duty to engage in violent holy war against the enemy Webber et al.
Some analyses have spanned both individual and group levels: for example, Schmid proposes that either for individuals i.
Similarly, Hogg and Adelman have defined extremism through the aspects covering group level i. While we applaud the development of more nuanced ways to understand religious extremism, and the diversity of definitions above, we propose that such distinctions do not go far enough in unpacking the multiple ways in which extremism can be expressed.
To allow for the development of this diversity, we adopt a broader definition of extremism and define extremism as the extent to which there are clear norms about appropriate behavior and very little latitude in accepting different pattern of norms or particular behaviors.
Thus, the focus is not so much on the behavior itself, but on the extent to which particular behaviors are normatively prescribed within a religious group with little room for deviating from that. Therefore, what is perceived as extreme in one historical or cultural context may be moderate or mainstream in another.
This usage is in contrast to the definitions proposed by scholars who have associated extremism exclusively with violent intergroup conflict. In line with Sedgwick , we propose that religion, either at individual or group level, can be expressed along a continuum ranging from moderate to extreme, but go further by arguing that there is not one continuum, but multiple dimensions of religion.
We discuss the implication of embracing extremism in one dimension but not in others, and argue that the specific constellations of moderate vs.
To illustrate the multiple dimensions of religious extremism, we focus on the context of Indonesian Muslim groups. We propose that our analysis should also help to understand religious extremism in other faith groups but that the dimensions on which moderate vs. We are certainly not the first to propose that there are multiple dimensions to religion and that these dimensions uniquely connect to important behaviors, such as life satisfaction, stress, youth deviancy. Glock and Stark suggested that within all religions, there are five distinct components: ideological beliefs , intellectual knowledge , ritual overt religious behavior , experiential feelings or emotions , and consequential the effect of religiosity in the world.
More recently, Saroglou proposed four basic dimensions of religion and individual religiosity that are partially distinct: believing i. According to these models, and others, the behavioral expression of religion is complex and multi-faceted. We draw on these frameworks to examine religious extremism. Combining insights from these prior models, we propose a multidimensional structure to religion that can help to understand the ways in which moderate vs.
We elaborate our four-dimensional model below, but to summarize: our starting point is the literature on violent religious extremism, where the most common dimension identified and often the only dimension considered is the political dimension. In addition, we were inspired by various religious movements in Indonesia that have different emphasis on their narratives and actions. However, they tend to accept the current political system employed to rule the nation.
In contrast, Hizbut Tahrir , a banned organization in Indonesia, proposes that Muslims are responsible to recreate an Islamic empire, by rejecting democratic systems and nation-states; however, Hizbut Tahrir does not typically engage in theological debates. Therefore, alongside the political dimension, we also consider three other dimensions which emerge in seeking to understand religious extremism in Indonesia.
Some groups have very little latitude in how they understand and practice their religious rituals and justify the other practices as forbidden innovation. Finally, we propose a social dimension that captures the intra- and intergroup relations of the religious group in Indonesia. Before elaborating these dimensions, it is important to note that the four focal dimensions in the present paper do not imply that other dimensions do not exist when explaining religious extremism.
Yet, these four dimensions may become more or less important as a result of particular historical and cultural developments or group comparisons, and this may also mean that other dimensions may need to be considered for other religious groups, and when studying other contexts see also, Zarkasyi, ; Ysseldyk et al. Below we consider the four dimensions in turn, and identify how the dimensions might be used in research.
We address religious extremism and the multiple dimensions of religion in Figure 1. Using a classical standpoint that religion is expressed through multiple dimensions Glock and Stark, ; Saroglou, , we propose to examine a multidimensional religious extremism through separate political, theological, ritual, and social dimensions which may or may not co-vary. Figure 1. Illustration of the extreme-moderate continuum across a multidimensional representation of religion. The figure illustrates a religious group with high extremism in theological and ritual dimensions but moderate beliefs in the social and political dimensions.
We argue that this exercise enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of religious extremism as presented in Table 1. In what follows, we draw attention to the interplay of these different dimensions for different religious groups.
We argue that the four dimensions of religious extremism i. Following our outline of the four dimensions, we discuss a methodology for measuring context-specific religious extremism and discuss research applications.
Table 1. Mapping out the moderate and extreme end points of the four dimensions of religion. The way that religion and politics should relate has been a source of intense debate and struggle throughout history Armstrong, In the psychological literature, the political dimension of religion has not received much attention e. In this approach, extreme religious movements seek political power, to promote the adoption of their religious norms through laws or force.
Contemporary religious extremism in the political dimension for Islam is often associated with support for the Caliphate or Muslim empire, which persisted in various forms from the s to AD, when the last Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in Turkey.
During this time, Islam was associated with both a hierarchical, sometimes expansionist, imperial state and a specific system of religious, legal, and cultural practices called sharia law.
More extreme groups advocate a radical agenda in political change e. They believe that political norms should be applied to change the current locally adapted political systems across many Muslim countries. Other, more moderate groups, however, strive for an integration of religious values within the current political systems e.
They tend to believe that religion should not be politically represented through the legalization of its social order. The political dimension is typically the most salient dimension for scholars when discussing Islamic religious extremism, as it is for other groups. More extreme stances on this political dimension such as support for comprehensive sharia , support for the resurrection of the Caliphate, and the rejection of democracy were used by Fealy to identify extremist groups in Indonesia e.
In addition, the extent to which religious groups approve of and participate in current political systems in Indonesia has been used to identify the more moderate Islamic movements in Indonesia e. It should be noted, however, that religious extremism on the political dimension can manifest in different ways, and that politically extremist groups propose different paths to reconcile the constitution with religious norms. For example, some religious groups propose to promote sharia laws through democratic governance, other groups reject the current political system by actively campaigning for the imposition of sharia without violence; and finally, still other groups are willing to use violence to destabilize the government See Ward, ; Webber et al.
With or without support for violent means of creating change, the advocacy toward comprehensive sharia law as well as the revival of an Islamic empire reflects a radical agenda to transform the current established political system. In addition to these different views regarding the place of religion in the state, groups of Muslim also differ in their support for democracy e. Some of them reject democracy, believing that democracy as a political system is incompatible with Islam Fealy, ; Ward, , that Islamic instructions about all matters relating to life are clearly articulated in the Quran and Hadith the words, behaviors, and approvals of the prophet.
This view holds that the musyawara political discussions to reach a consensus should only be used for decisions about particular technical matters, not core principles of social functioning Nurhayati, In contrast, some other groups of Muslim do not favor or sanction a particular political system, but rather advocate for principles of tolerance and respect in the governance of all political systems.
In this way, the latter groups perceive democracy as one way to manage national affairs that is not in conflict with Islam Ward, ; Nurhayati, How then do more moderate vs. We propose that for religious groups that are located at the moderate end of the theological dimension, beliefs of an impersonal cosmic force distanced from worldly affairs deism dominate.
Moderate views of God as a personal agent theism; Bader and Palmer, present a being fostering love and not hostility, whereby the image of God is characterized by gracious images e. In contrast, groups that are located at the extreme end of the theological continuum typically view God as a personal agent and embrace names for God that contain an authoritarian image e. There is evidence that these images of God are consequential. For example, normative beliefs associated with an authoritarian image of God predict more support for capital punishment Bader and Palmer, In addition, an authoritarian conception e.
Building on this approach, we propose that variation on the theological dimension of extremism is associated with different behaviors to achieve group goals and to show loyalty to the religious group. Moderate positions on the theological dimension are indicated by the prominence of gracious images of God and an appreciation of differences in theological beliefs. Conversely, those groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum, embracing an authoritarian image of God, are more likely to strike at perceived contrary theological beliefs.
For example, we propose that those who believe in an authoritarian, persecuting God will be more likely to believe that natural disasters occur more frequently to groups who live in ways that God disapproves of. Specific rituals allow for the expression of worship or shared feelings with others Whitehouse and Lanman, , helping to construe notions of religion as a lived experience. Many religious people believe that their religious rituals are guided directly by God.
For instance, most Muslims believe that God directs their main rituals including their prayers five times per day. This is based on an analysis of census statistics and data from a survey of U. Muslims , which was conducted in English as well as Arabic, Farsi and Urdu.
Based on the same analysis, Pew Research Center also estimates that there are 2. Our demographic projections estimate that Muslims will make up 2.
There are two major factors behind the rapid projected growth of Islam, and both involve simple demographics. For one, Muslims have more children than members of other religious groups. Around the world, each Muslim woman has an average of 2. Muslims are also the youngest median age of 24 years old in of all major religious groups, seven years younger than the median age of non-Muslims. As a result, a larger share of Muslims already are, or will soon be, at the point in their lives when they begin having children.
This, combined with high fertility rates, will fuel Muslim population growth. While it does not change the global population, migration is helping to increase the Muslim population in some regions, including North America and Europe. Overall, Americans gave Muslims an average rating of 48 degrees, similar to atheists Americans view more warmly the seven other religious groups mentioned in the survey Jews, Catholics, mainline Protestants, evangelical Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and Mormons.
But views toward Muslims as well as several of the other groups are now warmer than they were a few years ago; in , U. This partisan gap extends to several other questions about Muslims and Islam.
Views on this question have become much more partisan in the last 14 years see graphic. But most Americans do not see widespread support for extremism among Muslims living in the U. In spring , we asked residents of 10 European counties for their impression of how many Muslims in their country support extremist groups, such as ISIS. The same survey asked Europeans whether they viewed Muslims favorably or unfavorably.
Perceptions varied across European nations: Majorities in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Greece say they view Muslims unfavorably, while negative attitudes toward Muslims are much less common in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe.
People who place themselves on the right side of the ideological scale are much more likely than those on the left to see Muslims negatively. Wiktorowicz researched his book by embedding himself with al-Muhajiroun, an extremist Salafist group based in London. He found that the group preyed on disoriented young Muslims — not poor or oppressed themselves but confused and looking for meaning.
In addition to illuminating certain psychological aspects of the radicalization process and tactics used by extremist groups, it pinpoints missed opportunities by British moderates. This book is a must-read for anybody interested in radicalization in the West and how to counter it.
Through careful empirical evidence, he sheds light on how educated but alienated young Muslims adopt their hate-filled messages and cheer for Bin Laden. A must-read for anyone interested in the sources of terrorism. From the pyramid perspective, radicalisation is the gradient distinguishing the active terrorists from the broader base of sympathisers. The model leaves open the question of how a person moves from the base to the extremes of the apex, an element that is best studied in the Borum and Moghaddam models.
An interesting observation from their work, however, is that many of the mechanisms of radicalisation of individuals and groups are largely reactive. The drivers are not intrinsic to specific individuals but are found in the contexts they inhabit.
This is essentially a relational approach and the radicalisation of non-state groups can be interpreted as a response to the actions of other actors. Radicalization emerges in a relationship of intergroup competition and conflict in which both sides are radicalized.
The four visualisations presented above are suggestive of what the process of radicalisation might look like. From the simpler to the more comprehensive, the incremental complexity of these figures indicates seven lessons to be taken into account when detecting and countering radicalisation towards violent extremism. Only a small minority of radicals use strategic violence to attract media attention.
The majority of extremists are not visible and use non-violent methods, which are more effective in achieving their stated goals. Counter-terrorism must target the visible part of the iceberg, whereas counter-radicalisation needs to aim at the underwater section of the iceberg, which is much larger. Not the other way around. Living underground can be a grim experience and not everyone is equally motivated in finding a rationalisation for violence. Terrorist organisations tend to recruit disciplined individuals who can follow orders and do as they are told.
The unpredictable, the unstable and the traumatised are weeded out. The most common characteristic of terrorists is their normality. Even autonomous self-starters who radicalise on the internet need social interaction with a long-distance recruiter.
Evidence points to the importance of neighbours, cliques of friends, and relatives in explaining indoctrination. The progressive intensification of radical beliefs is still bound by territory and is very context dependent.
Furthermore, radicalisation with like-minded people rarely occurs in the virtual space and more often takes place in cities and neighbourhoods which act as fertile grounds in which to harden ideological positions. Individuals are at the centre of this socialisation process but what goes in the sociopolitical environment and surrounding organisations also matters. A comprehensive strategy to counter radicalisation needs to take into account the individual, organisational and societal level.
In fact, the causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are abundant and there is no single theory that can integrate all the triggers of radicalisation. Factors contributing to violent radicalisation processes can be: familial, social, gender-based, socioeconomic, psychological, religious, ideological, historical, cultural, political, propaganda, social media or internet-based. The events and conditions leading a person from radical ideas to violent action are also numerous, and the mechanisms are so complex that they need to be broken down to be understood.
Hence, there is a clear need to incorporate a multi-level understanding of radicalisation that covers individuals, groups and the mass public and tries to specify the interactions between them.
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